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Sinceabout1974, bankS shareofthe marketforshort-term
businesslendinghasbeen steadilyerodedthrough compe-
tition with nonbank creditors. This paper tries to identify
somefactors that may affect bank competitiveness in this
category in the short run and discusses how thesefactors
may have contributed to banks loss of market share.
Estimation of a simple linear model in first differences
indicates that banks market share responds negatively in
the short run to above-average default risk and/or mone-
tary tightness andto a decrease in banks value ofdeposit
insurance. Banks market share responds positively to an
increase in the level of interbank competition. Extrap-
olationfrom the short-run model to long-run effects dem-
onstrates the plausibility that above average risk and/
or monetary tightness and increases in the aggregate
weighted capital-to-assets ratio, which contributes to de-
creases in the value ofdeposit insurance, may haveplayed
a small role in banks loss of market share since the
mid-1970s.
Sinceabout 1974, banks' share ofthe marketfor short-term
business lending has been steadilyeroded through compe-
tition with a variety of alternative creditors, including
finance companies and the commercialpapermarket. This
paper tries to identify some factors that may affect bank
competitiveness in this market, at least in the short run,
with competitiveness being measured by banks' market
share ofshort-term business credit outstanding..
A reduced form model of bank market share is pre-
sented. In this model, market share over time depends on
four factors that theoretically could affect the relative
supply anddemandfor short-termbankbusinessloans over
time, specifically: (1) changes in the overall level ofrisk in
the economy, (2) financial innovation, (3) bank regulatory
costs and benefits, and (4) the level ofinterbank competi-
tion. On the basis ofthis model, a time series is estimated
using linear regression techniques.
Becausethedatafail stationarityandcointegrationtests,
the model is estimated in first differences and only short-
run influences are identified. I find some evidence that
bankmarket share in short-term business lending responds
negatively in the short run to an increase in banks' aggre-
gate weighted capital-to-assets ratio (taken as a proxy for
the value ofdepositinsurance) andpositivelyto anincrease
in the percentage oftotal bank assets that is held by bank
holding companies headquartered in states with interstate
banking (taken as a proxy for the level of interbank
competition). In addition, banks' market share appears to
fall whenever the deviation is positive between the com-
mercial paper-Treasury bill spread and that spread's
mean (taken as aproxyforeitherthe levelofeconomy-wide
default risk or the stance ofmonetary policy).
On the basis of the regression results, the paper then
discusses the possible roles played by the various indepen-
dent variables in explaining the decline in bank market
share. However, because the lack of cointegration in the
model means that the explanatory variables cannot fully
account for the long-run influences on bank market share,
the conclusions offered are treated as tentative.
Tue paper is organized as follows: Section I contains
some background on banks' competitors in short-term
business lending. Section II discusses the factors that in
theory could affect bank competitiveness in short-term
business lending. Section III presents a reduced form
model of bank market share, defines variables, and dis-
cusses data and econometric issues. Section IV contains18 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
regressionresults. SectionVdiscussesthe possibleroles of
the various independentvariables inexplaining the decline
in bank competitiveness, and Section VI concludes.
I. BANKS' COMPETITORS IN
SHORT-TERM BUSINESS FINANCE
In this study, bank competitiveness in short-term business
lending is measured by bank market share in this cate-
gory, based on data from the Board ofGovernors' Flow of
Funds Accounts. As of the third quarter of 1992, bank
loans accounted for 52.6 percent of short-term credit to
nonfinancial business, "other intermediated credit" for
39.3 percent, and commercial paper for 8.1 percent.!
The Flow ofFunds Accounts include several sources of
what is here called "other intermediated credit," and in
the following discussion, I will focus on the two largest,
namely, finance companies and offshore lenders.2 Finance
companies, like commercial banks, are financial inter-
mediaries. They raise funds in the commercial paper
market, often selling their paper to money market mutual
funds, and they lend to both businesses and individuals.
Because they do not take insured deposits, finance com-
panies are not subject to regulations, such as reserve re-
quirements and capital requirements, that apply to banks.
In this study, offshore credit may originate from foreign
banks or other entities that are located outside the United
States.3 Domestic subsidiaries offoreignbanks, as well as
U.S. agencies andbranches offoreignbanks, are excluded
from the definition of offshore lenders. Offshore lenders
arefor themostpartnot subjecttothe sameregulations that
face domestic banks.
The third source ofshort-term business credit, commer-
cial paper, consists of unsecured short-term promissory
notes that are offered to investors eitherthrough dealers or
directly by the issuer. Original maturities of commercial
paperrange from one to 270 days, butaverage less than 60
days. The commercial paper market is a direct debt mar-
1. Trade credit also is a potentially important source of short-term
business credit, but itis omitted from the total in this study. In addition,
hereshort-termcreditgenerally has amaturitythat is less than one year.
2. Using the Flow of Funds breakdown of "other loans" (called here
"other intermediated credit") for the nonfinancial corporate sector and
applying it to the entire nonfinancial business sector, I estimate, that,
as ofyear-end 1989, for example, finance company loans accounted for
54 percent ofother intermediatedcredit to nonfinancial business. Other
sources and their shares were: offshore (14.5), U.S. government (13.4),
bankers' acceptances (7.4), savings and loans (6.7), and government-
sponsored agencies (4).
3. A small proportion ofthis credit is from offshore bookings ofU.S.-
chartered banks.
ket, meaning that commercial paper credit is not inter-
mediated. Most commercial paper is backedby banklines
ofcreditandis thereforeissuedby those abletoobtainsuch
lines ofcredit, that is, the most creditworthy borrowers.4
Some commercial paper is sold indirectly through deal-
ers.5 Thus, the commercial paper market is regulated
indirectly by the SEC, which has the authority to issue
rules, such as capital requirements, that govern all se-
curities dealers. The SEC also has regulatory authority
over some commercial paper investors, such as money
market mutual funds. However, any such regulations ap-
pearto have beenrelativelyinconsequentialto the commer-
cial paper market during the period under study; they
receive little or no attention in discussions ofthe commer-
cial paper market and in studies of competition between
banks and the commercial paper market.6
II. DETERMINANTS
OF BANK COMPETITIVENESS
In this section, I discuss variables which, in theory, could
affect bank competitiveness in short-term business lend-
ing. These variables represent aspects of the ultimate
determinants ofbank competitiveness in short-term busi-
ness lending: the supply and demand for short-term bank
loans relative to the supply and demand for alternative
short-term business financing. The variables relate to the
level ofrisk in the economy, the relative benefits to banks
versus other types of creditors of financial innovation,
bank regulatory costs and benefits, and the level ofinter-
bank competition.7
Economists have several theories about the comparative
advantagebankshave inserving higher-riskcustomers. For
4. According to Moody's, about 84 percent of the total commercial
paper issues worldwide are issued by companies with A-I ratings from
Standard and Poor's and P-I from Moody's. See Fuerbringer (1991).
5. Dealers take only about 5-10 percent of the commercial paper they
buy into their own inventories. They purchase the remainder for other
investors and typicallycharge acommissionofabout 1/10to 1/8percent
on an annual basis (Cook and Rowe 1986, p.1l6.)
6. See, for example, Estrella (1987), Hurley (1977), Judd (1979), and
Cook and Rowe (1986). Hurley does mention that dealers who take
relatively high-risk paper (i.e., when the issuer is unrated by two rating
services) into inventory have to hold more capital. This rule went into
effectin mid-1977, butwould have beenofvery littleconsequence tothe
commercial paper market as a whole, because the vast majority of
commercial paper is rated.
7. The list ofexplanatory variables used here is far from exhaustive. For
example, Ihave not considered variables thatmay affect abank's choice
between making short-term business loans and making other types of
investments. However, the ratio of bank short-term business credit to
total bank loans and leases has changed relatively little between 1972example, Diamond (1984) pointed out that information-
gathering and evaluation ofborrowers and their projects is
more efficiently conducted once by a single intermediary,
such as a bank, than repeatedly by numerous individual
lenders. In addition, long-term relationships with bor-
rowers can be a unique source of information. Such
relationships, by their nature, can only be maintained
between a borrower and at most ahandful oflenders. This
comparative advantage in information-gathering and anal-
ysis presumably· enables intermediaries to make higher-
risk loans than those that are made in the direct debt
market, because information may lower the effective risk
to the lender. This intuition is consistent with the observa-
tion that issuers ofcommercial papertend to be quite low-
risk borrowers.
When intermediaries' information-gathering includes
monitoring borrowers' adherence to loan commitments,
their relative ability to serve higher-risk customers may be
even further enhanced. In this view, monitoring is an
additional form ofinformation gathering. Diamond (1991)
shows that intermediaries who monitor are especially
valuableto borrowers withcreditratingstoward theIPiddle
of the spectrum. In the presence of moral hazard (the
incentive that a borrower has to defaulton a loan because
his own money is not at risk), borrowers need to offer
potential lenders some assurance that they will not renege.
The highest-rated borrowers can credibly "stake their
reputation" on their promise to honor their obligations-
theirgoodreputation is what allows them to raisecapital at
alowerrate, and it mustbe maintained to retain this source
ofhigher profits. These high-rated borrowers do not need
to be monitored, and they access debt markets directly. In
contrast, very low-rated borrowers have littleto lose ifthey
reveal bad news about themselves by defaulting, or by
beingcaughtwhenmonitored. Medium-riskborrowers are
the ones who need to be able to offerfuture directlenders a
good "track record" of having been monitored and not
found wanting.
Among intermediaries, banks are thought to have spe-
cial loan-monitoring capabilities, which may stem from
banks' special access to information, including informa-
tion regarding transactions activity, gained from deposit
relationships with borrowers (Black 1975). In addition,
(the earliest year for which such data are easily available) and 1990,
rangingfrom around 30 to 34percent. In addition, althoughincreases in
off-balance-sheetactivities may havecontributedto adeclineinall types
ofloans, Baerand Pavel (1988) attribute the growth ofoff-balance-sheet
activities partially to increases in banks' capital requirements, and this
is controlledfor in the model presentedhere. Ialso have not attempted to
measure banks' cost ofcomplying with numerous and varied consumer
regulations.
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even if banks do not lend to their own depositors, their
general depositrelationships are likely to yieldinformation
about the state oflocal and regional economies that might
be usefulin monitoring. For example, a bankermay assess
a local customer's ability to meet loancommitments differ-
ently depending on whetherornotthat customer's industry
is experiencing a downturn in the area. Banks may be able
to glean advance knowledge ofsuch a downturn from, for
example, changes in the inflow and outflow oftransactions
deposits. 8
The fact that banks monitor and may thereby have a
comparativeadvantagein makingriskyloans indicates that
the general level ofrisk in the economymay influence the
relative demand for bank credit. However, the direction of
influence can be positive or negative. For example, Dia-
mond's model suggests that, as the general level of risk
increases, more borrowers in the lowest-risk category may
optfor bankcredit, but, atthe sametime, the bankmay lose
more borrowers to the highest-risk category than it gained
from the lowest-risk category.
The next factor to be considered is financial innovation.
Here, it is suggested that the financial innovations that
began in the 1970s may have put banks at a disadvantage
relative to other lenders and therefore may have affected
bank competitiveness in the period under study.
Any disadvantage stemming from financial innovation
would have resulted largely from regulations that banks
face but other lenders do not. In particular, the develop-
ment and subsequent growth of money market mutual
funds, beginning in the early 1970s, caused an outflow of
savings from banks. This is because banktime and savings
accounts had legally mandated ceilings on interest rates,
and money market mutual funds offered a way to circum-
vent these restrictions. Thus, money market mutual fund
growth accelerated significantly in1973 and 1974, when
market rates increased to new highs, and also in later
periods ofhigh rates.
Whether savings outflows into money market mutual
funds actually decreasebanks' short-termbusinesslending
is somewhatdebatable. Onereasonto suspectthatthey may
not is that such outflows affect only a subset of funding
sources. Banks can obtain funding from sources other than
retail deposits (including money market mutual funds
themselves, which may purchase bank certificates of de-
posit) and may therefore substitute purchased funds for
8. See Fama (1985) for amodel in which banks have special monitoring
capabilities and in which bankborrowing is useful to borrowers because
itgenerates informationwhich is usefulto the borrower's otherpotential
lenders. James (1987) also has found empirical evidence that the
informationgenerated by bankloans is useful to borrowers as asignal of
creditworthiness.20 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
retail deposits. In addition, banks can shift asset portfo-
lios, and therefore there is no a priori reason to believe that
a reduction infunding affects short-termbusiness credit in
particular. However, despite the fungible nature of bank
liabilities and assets, the development of money market
funds may indeed curtail bank competitiveness in short-
term business lending. In addition, otherfinancial innova-
tions, such as advances in corporate cash management
techniques and greater use of security repurchase agree-
ments, which both reduce the demand for demand de-
posits, also may affect banks' short-termbusiness lending.
Moreover, the growth ofmoney market mutual funds in .
particularmay affectbankcompetitivenessnot only by way
of savings outflows, but also by way of a beneficial
synergistic effect on the competitiveness offinance com-
panies and the commercial paper market. This is because
the largest single category ofmoney market mutual fund
investments is commercial paper, and finance companies
raise most of their funds through the commercial paper
market, selling mainly to money market mutual funds. 9
The next few variables to be considered as influences on
bank competitiveness also derive their potential impor-
tance from the unique regulation of banks. First, banks
face reserve requirements-that is, they must hold non-
interest bearing deposits at the central bank-while their
competitorsdo not. Reserverequirementstherefore impose
a cost on banks relative to their competitors, who may
optimally invest all their funds. However, as with savings
outflows, whether a general increase in required reserves
affects banks' business lending in particular might be
questioned. The implicit tax on banks might be passed on
mainly to banks' borrowers (but even then perhaps mostly
to non-business customers) in the form ofhigher interest
rates on loans, thereby decreasing the equilibrium supply
ofloans, but it might be passed on mainly to depositors in
the form oflower interestrates on deposits, thereby having
little effect on bank credit.10 In Section IV, I will investi-
gate empirically whether reserve requirements really do
affect banks' share ofbusiness credit.
Second, banks have access to deposit insurance, while
theircompetitors do not. Deposit insurance benefits banks
because it allows them to raise funds at risk-free interest
rates, nomatterhowriskytheirloans. AsMerton(1977)has
shown, banks hold a put option in the form of deposit
9. As of 1990, 48.4 percent of money market mutual fund assets
consisted ofcommercial paper (Post 1992).
10. See Black (1975) for a model in which the interest foregone on
reserves is passed on in the form of lower interest for depositors. See
Farna (1985) for a model in which the reserve tax on certificates of
deposit is borne by bank borrowers.
insurance that, all other things equal, increases the prof-
itability ofhigh-riskloans by allowingbanks toreap ahigh
payoff if they "win," while letting the insurer payoff
depositorsifthey"lose." However, banksdo paypremiums
for deposit insurance. Various au.thors have attempted to
determine whether, in practice, the net value of deposit
insurancetobanksispositiveornegative, withinconclusive
results. For example, Pennacchi (1987) concluded that the
answer depends on the degree ofthe insurance authority's
regulatory control over banks. However, whether deposit
insurance has, on net, a positive or negative value, we can
say that an increase in the value should increase banks'
returns, enhance their ability to attract funds, and thereby
increasetheirrelativesupplyofcredit. Likewise, adecrease
in the value of deposit insurance would be expected to
decrease banks' relative supply ofcredit.
Third, over much ofthe period under study, Regulation
Q ceilings on bank interest rates were in effect, and these
may have played a role in bank competitiveness, comple-
mentary to but separate from their role as spurs to innova-
tion. As mentioned above, an .important feature of the
economy in the early to mid-1970s was the increase in
short-terminterestrates in theface ofceilingsonconsumer
deposit rates at commercial banks. Even if increases in
spreads between market rates and deposit ceilings had not
encouraged the development of money market mutual
funds, they still likely wouldhave increaseddisintermedia-
tion, that is, the flow of funds out of banks and into
whateverhigheryielding market assets existed at the time.
Fourth, market structure.in the banking industry has
likely changed due to the liberalization ofinterstate bank-
ing. LadermanandPozdena(1991)foundthattheliberaliz-
ation of interstate banking laws tends to increase the
competitiveness ofbanking markets, as new opportunities
open up for competitors to enter from out-of-state. Conse-
quently, because outputandtotalrevenue are greaterunder
perfect competition than under monopoly, interstate bank-
ing may increase banks' total dollarvalue ofassets. There-
fore, assuming no change inthe levelofcompetition within
other sectors ofthe short-term business creditmarket, itis
reasonable to suppose that the liberalization of interstate
banking may increase bank competitiveness in short-term
business lending. 11
11. BecauseI amviewing banksas competingwith otherintermedialies
andthe directdebtmarket, I do not actually thinkofany bankas having
as much marketpoweras a monopolist would have. Even ifitis the only
bank in the area, any bank would have competitors in the form ofother
types oflenders. Despite this, it still is reasonable to examine the effect
of bank market structure on aggregate bank credit, because banks
remainthe majorproviders inseveral areas, including payments system
services, demand deposits, and short-term business credititself.m. MODEL OF BANKS' SHARE
OF SHORT-TERM BUSINESS CREDIT
In this section, I present a model ofbank competitiveness
in short-termbusiness lending. This model is afunction of
the factors thatwere discussed in SectionII, andituses the
following empirical measures for these factors.
RISK = 6-month commercial paper interest rate
- 6-month Treasury bill interest rate
- mean ofthis difference over the
period 1960-1990;
TBHIGH = highest 6-month Treasury bill interest
rate to date;
RESREQ = (aggregate required reserves/total bank
assets) x 6-month Treasury bill interest
rate;
KARATIO = total bank capital/total bank assets;
PREM = net aggregate deposit insurance assess-
ments/total insured deposits;
SPREAD = difference between 3-month Treasury bill
interest rate and ceiling on interest rate
on savings deposits, if this difference is
positive, zero otherwise;
and
INTERST = percentage oftotal bank assets held by
bank holding companies that are head-
quartered in states that permit interstate
banking.
RISK·measures the level ofrisk in the economy. Since
the commercial paper interest rate reflects a default risk,
while the •interest rate on Treasury bills is essentially
risk-free, the spread between the two rates may be an
indicator of overall risk in the economy (Friedman and
Kuttner1991).12Iusethe deviation ofthe paper-bill spread
from its meanto measure the level of risk relative to a
"normal" level of risk for the period. It should be noted
that the paper-bill spread··also can be interpreted as· a
12. As Friedman and Kuttner point out, even ifthe actual incidence of
default by commercial paper issuers is relatively rare, the paper-bill
spread still may be a satisfactory gauge ofthe perceived level ofoverall
default risk. One reason simply may be that subjective probabilities of
default, even if rational, may not equal the frequency rate of default
observed within any finite time period. Another possibility is that
subjective probabilities are not in fact rational. Because it is subjective
default probabilities that matter in the context ofthe explanation given
above for the potential importance ofrisk, the paper-bill spread would
seem to be satisfactory.
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measure ofthe tightness ofmonetary policy, with a higher
spread indicating greater tightness. It is expected that
monetarypolicytighteningwoulddifferentiallyaffectbank
lending, lowering banks' share of short-term business
credit.!3
It may also be noted that, as a measure ofdefault risk,
the effect of an increase in this variable on bank market
share is expected to be either positive or negative, as
explainedin SectionII. On the otherhand, as ameasure of
the tightness ofmonetary policy, its effectis expectedto be
unambiguously negative.
TBHIGH measures financial innovations. Rather than
attempt to measure particular financial innovations di-
rectly, Iuse avariablethatotherresearchers have used as an
indicatorofthe incentive for financial innovations, because
it should serve well as a general measure of all such
innovations, not just particular innovations. For example,
financial innovations like money market mutual funds,
security repurchase agreements, and cash management
methods become more attractive as interest rates rise.
For consumers, the spread between market interest rates
afJ.d ceilings on bank rates rises with market rates, creating
a market for money market mutual funds. For businesses,
the spread between market rates and bank deposit rates
is positive and also tends to rise with market interest
rates, creating a market for ways to economize on transac-
tions balances, such as repurchase agreements and cash
management.
So, increases in market interest rates may increase the
profitabilityofinvesting infinancial innovations. However,
ifthere is a fixed cost to such innovation (for example, the
cost oftraining staffto manage repurchase agreements or
the writing ofmutual fund management software), it will
not be undertaken unless the present discounted value of
the interest gained thereby is at least as high as the fixed
cost.
Previous authors, for example, Enzler, Johnson, and
Paulus (1976), have suggested using the previous highest
interest rate as a measure ofthe perceived net profitability
offinancial innovation. The ideahere is thatonly ifinterest
rates rise to unprecedented levels will firms perceive that
the high rates will persistlong enough to make the benefits
ofinnovation outweigh the costs. In addition, subsequent
13. Friedman and Kuttner (1991), in contrast, argue that changes in
bankloansrelativetototalcreditresultingfrom atighteningofmonetary
policy cause changes in the paper-bill spread. In the model presented
here, monetary policy would simultaneously raise the paper-bill spread
(as well as other interestrate spreads, such as the bankloan-bill spread
and the certificate of deposit-bill spread) and lower banks' relative
supply ofbusiness credit.22 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
reductions in interest rates will not reverse the process,
because the innovations already will be in place. 14
RESREQ measures the cost of reserve requirements.
Aggregate required reserves is multiplied by a nominal
interest rate, the 6-month Treasury bill rate, because re-
quired reserves pay no interest. This means that the oppor-
tunitycostthatbanksface as a result ofhaving to hold such
reserves rises with the return that would be earned were
such reserves not required. The reserve requirement vari-
able has total bank assets in the denominator as a scaling
factor.
KARATIO and PREM measure changes in the value of
depositinsurance. Depositinsurancecanbe thoughtofas a
putoption, and, as shownby Merton (1977), its value to the
bank depends negatively on the bank's capital-to-assets
ratio. I measure this ratio with the aggregate book value of
capital divided by the aggregate book value of assets,
which equals the weighted average of individual bank
capital-to-assets ratios, where the weightis the ratio ofthat
bank's assets to total bank assets.15 PREM, which controls
for banks' cost of deposit insurance, measures premium
assessments, net ofcredits, per dollar ofinsured deposits.
(Up until the early 1980s, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation refunded to banks a portion of assessment
income at the end ofeach year.)
SPREAD measures the level of disintermediation. The
3-monthTreasury bill rate is used rather than the 6-month
rate because the 3-month bill is the more liquid ofthe two
instruments. The same reasoning applies to the use ofthe
ceiling on savings depositinterestrates ratherthanthe ceil-
ing on rates on bank certificates of deposit. 16
14. Enzler, Johnson, and Paulus (1976) use previous peak interest rates
ratherthan peak interest rates to date, presumably because they see this
variable as working with a lag. I include in my regression eight lags on
the highest interest rate to date.
15. The capital-to-assets ratio may also affect bank competitiveness
through its effect on banks' tax burden. Because debt is generally
favored in the tax structure, an increase in the capital-to-assets ratio
tends to increase taxes, and thereby, all other things equal, impairbank
competitiveness relative to other creditors. It is also possible that an
increase in regulatorycapital minimums is at leastpartiallyanindicator
ofanincreasein omittedfactors thathave reduced bankprofitability and
competitiveness. In other words, regulators may have increased re-
quired capital-to-assets ratios in response to deteriorating bank health.
However, this explanationofthe effectofcapitalratios is more plausible
for the late 1980s than forthe period under study as a whole.
16. I use the savings deposit interest rate ceiling even after December
1982, when money marketdeposit accounts (MMDAs) were introduced
at banks. Even though MMDAs were not in general subject to a ceiling
on interest rates, ceilings did apply until January 1986 for accounts that
maintained an average balance of less than $2,500. However, see
Furlong (1983) for an account of the instant popularity of MMDAs,
despite this restriction.
INTERST measures interstate banking.I? As a measure
ofinterbankcompetition, the interstatebanking variable is
preferable to other variables such as concentration.ratios
because it is more of an underlying driving force. For
example, the concentration ratio in a local or regional
banking market may fall in response to the passage of
liberalized interstate banking laws. One could say that it
is the change in concentrationthat affects competition, but
the real driving force is the change inlaws. In addition, the
measure used here allows for competitionto be affectedby
the mere threat of entry, whereas concentration measures
do not. 18 Finally, interstate banking was found to be
correlated with higher levels of interbank competition
(Laderman and Pozdena 1991).
The Model
Letnominal short-termbusiness loans from banks,Lb, and
othernominal short-term business credit, Lo' be exponen-
tial functions such that
(la) Lb = exp (cb + "ht + f3~X + Eb)
and
(lb) Lo = exp (co + 'Yo t + I3~X + Eo),
where Cb and Co are constants, 'Yb and 'Yo are coefficients, t
is a time trend, f3b and 130 are vectors ofcoefficients, Xis a
vectorofthe seven explanatory variables, and Eb and Eo are
error terms.
Because the dependent variable is banks' share ofshort-
term business credit, it has a value that is restricted to be
between zero and one. The error term in the ordinary least
squares linear regression model takes on values between
negative infinity and infinity, so itis necessary to transform
the dependent variable so that ithas the same range. A cus-
tomary transformation, the logistic transform, maps (0, 1)
symmetrically into (- 00, 00). The logistic transform ofthe
share, s, is S, where
17. These data are from the Compustat bank file, which contains
headquarters location and asset data for a sample ofabout 150 leading
U.S. bank holding companies, representing about 80 percent of U.S.
bank assets.
18. It is possible that the interstate banking variable is endogenous;
states with weak banks may pass interstate bankinglaws with the hopes
of increasing the market values of their banks as potential acquisition
targets. However, this may not be a significant concern, because on
average, the liberalization of interstate banking laws decreases bank
stock returns (Laderman andPozdena 1991). Nevertheless, some con-
cern remains that the type ofeffect described might impart a negative
bias to the coefficient on the interstate banking variable.LADERMAN/ BANK VERSUS NONBANK COMPETITIVENESS 23
S = logh ~s)'
Letting LT be total short-term business credit, we have,
from (la) and (Ib),
FIGURE 1
BANKS' SHARE OF SHORT-TERM BUSINESS loANS
OUTSTANDING
with the coefficients and the error term in (3) correspond-
ingto the differences betweenthe coefficients and the error
terms, respectively, in the underlying equations (Ia) and
(Ib). Thus, the coefficients in (3) show the response of
outstanding nominal short-term bank credit relative to the
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Data
Themodel is estimatedusingquarterly datafrom the Board
of Governors' Flow of Funds Accounts for the first quar-
terof1960 through the end of1990.19 Aggregate required
reserves, total assets, and capital are measured in bil-
lions ofcurrent dollars and were obtained from the Board
of Governors' Annual Statistical Digest. 2o The 6-month
Treasury bill rate, the 3-month Treasury bill rate, the
ceiling rate on savings deposits, ,!-nd the 6-monthcommer-
cial paper rate all are in percentage terms.
The nontransformed version of banks' share of total
U.S. short-term nonfinancial business debt outstanding is
shown in Figure 1. The most striking feature is the steady
decline in banks' share thatbeginsinabout1974. However,
the goals ofthis paper are, first, to explain only short-run
variations in bank competitiveness and then to use these
results to explore only informally the possible reasons for
the long-run decline. Thus, Figure 1 mainly provides a
basis for subsequent discussion of econometric and mea-
surementissues. (For the interested reader, plots ofeach of
the explanatory variables are included in the Appendix.)
As shown in Table 1, the dependent variable, TSHARE
(S in equation (3)), and all but one, orpossibly two, ofthe
explanatory variables have unit roots and are thus nonsta-
tionary. The variable RISK stands out as the one definitely
stationary variable, while the reserve requirement variable
mayor may not be stationary. However, the treatment of
RESREQ as stationary or nonstationary did not affect the
results.
19. The numeratorofthe underlying (nontransformed) share variable is
labeled "bank loans not elsewhere classified" in the total credit out-
standing to nonfinancial business schedule of the Flow ofFunds. The
majority of bank loans to nonfinancial business that are "elsewhere
classified" are real estate loans. The denominator is bank loans not
elsewhere classified plus "other loans" (which excludes real estate
loans) plus "commercial paper."
20. The construction ofthe data series for KARATIO involved splicing
together capital and assets measures from two sets ofdata series-one
for domestic offices ofdomestically chartered banks CRCON") from
1960.Ql to 1969.Ql and the other for domestic andforeign offices of
domestically chartered banks ("RCFD") from 1969.Q2 to 1990.Q4-
becausethe RCON setchanged the definition ofcapital in 1983, and the
RCFD set only began in 1969.
This is a reasonable approach because U.S. banks had very few
foreign operations in 1969, andconsequently, the changes inthe spliced
series at the crossover points are very small-only 21 percent of the
standarddeviationofReFD assets (calculatedoverthe subsequentthree
years), and only 14 percent ofthe standard deviation ofRCFD capital,
for assets and capital, respectively.
The variables KARATIO and RESREQ use this spliced asset series
(based on data from the Annual Statistical Digest), while the variable
INTERST uses the total assets of banks included in the Compustat
sample.24 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
TABLE 1
TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS
(AUGMENTED DICKEy-FUlLER TESTS)




RESREQ - 3.23* -4.83***
KARATIO -0.87 -3.91***
PREM -0.51 - 3.57***
SPREAD -1.95 -3.68***
INTERST -0.92 -3.83***
*Reject null hypothesis (unit root) at 10% level.
***Reject null hypothesis at 1% level.
aWith constant and trend, 119 observations. Critical values for 100
observations: -4.04 (1%), -3.45 (5%), -3.15 (10%).
bWith constant, 118 observations. Critical values for 100 observa-
tions: -3.51 (1%), -2.89 (5%), -2.58 (10%).
Inthepresenceofnonstationarity, the normalprocedures
ofstatisticalinferencefor ordinary leastsquares regression
areinvalid. There are two possibleremedies. One is to find
a cointegratingrelationship between the nonstationary var-
iables in the equation. The otheris to estimate the equation
in first difference form, transforming each nonstationary
variable into the difference between itselfand itselflagged
one period.
Despite several explanatory variables with strong trends
(one indication of the possibility of causal relationships
between levels ofthe explanatory variables and the level of
the dependent variable), statistical tests showed that the
dependent variable is not cointegrated with the set ofnon-
stationary explanatory variables (whether or not RESREQ
is included in this set). Also, the dependent variable is not
cointegrated with any of the individual nonstationary
explanatory variables.21
A final data issue pertains to the dependent variable.
McCauley and Seth (1992) have argued that the Flow of
Funds data significantly underestimate the volume ofbusi-
21. A residual-based test for cointegration was used. TSHARE was
regressedonaconstant, atimetrend, andthe levels ofall ofthe explana-
tory variables except RISK. Then, a unitroot test was performedon the
residual from this regression, with four lags on the first difference of
the residual·in the unit root regression. Critical values were obtained
from Table llc in Phillips and Ouliaris (1990).
nesscreditbookedoffshore. Ifthis is true, then the depend-
ent variable is an overestimate of bank share as defined,
and regression results could be misleading. However, as
will be discussed below, results using the McCauley and
Seth measures ofoffshore loans are qualitatively similarto
those obtained using the Flow ofFunds data.
IV REGRESSION RESULTS
Results Using Flow ofFunds Measure
ofOffshore Loans
Giventhe lackofcointegration, equation(3) was estimated
using the first differences of the variables TSHARE,
TBHIGH, RESREQ, KARATIO, PREM, SPREAD, and
INTERST, and the level ofthe RISK variable. Note that the
time trend appears as a constant in the model in first
difference form.
It is reasonable to suppose that, if bank market share
responds to any ofthe explanatory variables, it is likely to
be only witha lag. Therefore, lags were applied to the ex-
planatory variables, and no contemporaneous terms were
included on the right-hand side of the regression. In
addition, because the dependent variable could have its
own important dynamics, lagged values ofthe dependent
variable were includedas explanatory variables. To econo-
mize on degrees of freedom and simultaneously pick the
lag lengths, the model was estimated using a final predic-
tion error (FPE) procedure, with the possibility of up to
eight lags on each explanatory variable. The FPE tech-
nique essentially selects the variables and the number of
lags on those variables to minimize the model's prediction
error.
The regression results are presented in Table 2.22 Note
that the FPE procedure did not select three ofthe variables
at all: TBHIGH, RESREQ, and PREM. (RESREQ was not
selectedwhetherit was includedin levels orfirst difference
form.) Apparently, changes inthese variables, representing
financial innovations, reserve requirements, and deposit
insurance premiums, respectively, do not aid in predicting
changes in banks' share ofshort-termbusiness lending. As
discussed in Section II, it may not be surprising that
TBHIGH and RESREQ do notappearto affect banks' share
of short-term business credit in particular. In light of
uncertaintyregarding the incidence ofreserve requirement
22. Two common diagnostic tests, a general Lagrange Multiplier (LM)
testfor autocorrelation ofthe errors, and an Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test for heteroskedasticity of the errors,
found that the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and no hetero-
skedasticity could not be rejected, lending further credence to the
results presented in Table 2.costs, an alternative measure, a variable based on the
reserve requirement ratio for certificates of deposit, was
substitutedfor RESREQ in the FPE regression (following a
determination that the new variable was nonstationary).23
However, the FPE procedure also did not choose this alter-
native measure.
Two of the included variables, the lagged dependent
variable and SPREAD, have negative coefficients at some
lags andpositivecoefficients at others. As indicatedby the
sums ofthe coefficients, the net effect after two years of
both of these variables appears to be positive. Whether
these net effects are statistically significant is debatable.
However, F tests point toward the lagged dependent vari-
able and the SPREAD being ofsome importance; F tests
indicate that the entire group ofcoefficients on the lagged
dependentvariablelikelyis statisticallysignificantandthat
the group of coefficients on the SPREAD variable likely
also is statistically significant.
The importance and direction of influence of RISK,
KARATIO, and INTERST are easier to interpret. These
three variables have consistent signs on their lags, and the
net effects all appear to be statistically significant.
Recall that RISK enters the regression in levels form.
Therefore, the results show that when the risk premium is
above its mean, the change in banks' market share over the
course of the following period is negative, all other vari-
ables held constant in levels. Furthermore, an increase in
anabove-averageriskpremium strengthens the subsequent
period's decrease in market share. On the other hand, an
increase in interbank competition appears to increase
banks' market share in the next period, as predicted. The
capital-to-assetsratioenterswithfour lags, withanegative
coefficient anda fairly high t statistic on eachofthem. Not
surprisingly, the t statistic for the sum also is high. As
predicted then, increases in banks' aggregate capital-to-
assets ratio seemto erode bankcompetitiveness, at leastin
the short run.
A priori, the sign on the risk variable was ambiguous.
An explanation for this was that banks tend to serve
customers with a medium absolute amountofrisk, so that,
as the general level ofrisk rises, the net inflow intobanks'
pool ofcustomersmay bepositive ornegative. Apparently,
neitherresult obtains; instead, itappears that as long asthe
risk premium is simply above its average, banks tend to
23. 1\'10 versions of the variable were tried. One was the reserve
requirement ratio for certificates ofdeposit with a denomination of at
least $100,000and a maturity ofless than 90days. The second was the
same ratio multiplied by the 6-month Treasury bill interest rate. These
alternatives to RESREQ were chosen followingFama (1985), which
showed that reserve requirement costs for certificates of deposit are
passed on to borrowers.
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TABLE 2
FPE REGRESSION RESULTS
TRANSFORMED BANK SHARE OF SHORT-TERM CREDIT
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE Lag Coefficient t-ratio
Constant 0 -0.0093 -3.4785










KARATIO 1 -3.7615 -2.2272
2 -2.7047 -1.6682
3 -3.1887 ~ 1.9449
4 -3.3731 -2.0883
Sum -13.0280 -2.8388












NOTE: All variables except RISK in first difference form.
lose market share in short-term business lending, all other
thingsequal. Again, though, itmustbepointedoutthatthe
proxy used to measure economy-wide default risk could
insteadbe aproxyfor the tightness ofmonetarypolicy. It is
not unreasonable to suppose that when monetary policy is
tighterthan average, banks lose market share in short-term
business lending.
Theapparentstatisticalsignificanceofthecoefficienton
the constantterm (as indicated by the sizeofthe t statistic)
also should be noted. With the model in first-difference
form, the coefficient on the constant represents the simple
effect ofthe passage oftime on the level ofbanks' market
share and is inthat sense representative ofthe unexplained
portion of the general downward trend in that variable.26 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
Results Using McCauley and Seth Measure
ofOffshore Loans
McCauley and Seth (1992) have argued that the Flow of
Funds data significantly understate the volume ofbusiness
credit booked offshore. More specifically, they estimate
that from 1984 through 1991, offshore credit to U.S. busi-
nesses (mostly corporations) was actually more than dou-
ble the amount reported by the Flow of Funds, and ·the
discrepancy increasedovertime. Ifthis is true, thenthe de-
pendent variable is an overestimate of bank share as
defined, at leastfrom 1984 on, and regression results could
be misleading.24 To test the possible importance ofthis, I
substitutedMcCauley and Seth'smeasureofoffshore loans
for the Flow of Funds measure of offshore loans and
recalculated the dependent variable for the years 1984
through 1990.25 The qualitative results were the same as
those seen in Table 2. 26
V. BANKS' Loss OF COMPETITIVENESS
IN SHORT-TERM BUSINESS LENDING
As seen in Figure 1, between 1974 and the end of
1990, banks' share of short-term business credit fell from
73.3percentto 53percent. This decline in sharetookplace
24. McCauley and Seth speculate that US. businesses miss large
amounts ofoffshore loans whenreporting onthe Treasuryforms thatthe
Flow·of Funds uses, because they do not know that these loans are
booked offshore. McCauley and Seth therefore use data reported by
foreign banking authorities, which is based on reports filed by lenders,
whopresumablyhave more accurateinformationthanborrowers regard-
ing the booking location. On the other hand, the definition ofoffshore
loans used by other central banks may not be strictly comparable with
the definition used in this paper; for example, some central banks may
report that their banks are lending to U.S.-based firms from non-US.
sites, when they are actually lending to foreign subsidiaries of US.-
owned firms.
25. Offshore credit to total nonfinancial business is not broken out
separately in theFlow ofFunds tables, but offshore credit to nonfinan- .
cial corporate business is. Therefore, I assumed that all offshore loans
were made to corporations, and I simply subtracted the Flow ofFunds
measure ofoffshore credit to corporations from total "other credit" to
nonfinancial businessesandthen addedtheMcCauleyandSethmeasure
to this category. I also assumed that, prior to 1984, the Flow ofFunds
measure ofoffshore loans was roughly correct. The lack ofcomparable
informationonoffshore creditbefore 1984 leaves little alternative but to
make such an assumption ifone wants to incorporate the McCauley and
Seth information. In addition, this approach is partiallyjustified by the
relative lack ofincentives for offshore booying prior to 1984.
26. As before, diagnostic tests for autocorrelation and heteroskedastic-
ity were conducted..The null hypothesis ofno autocorrelationcould not
be rejected. However, the ARCH test for heteroskedasticity indicated
that the null hypothesis of no first order autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity could be rejected at the 9 percent level.• While.this
resultis notdefinitive, itdoes indicatethat some caution should beused
in interpreting the t statistics reported in Table 2.
because, although banks' short-term business credit in-
creased in absolute terms, as shown in Figure 2, the two
othercategoriesofshort-termbusinesscredit increased ata
faster rate. As it turns out, other intermediaries' share of
short-term business loans outstanding increased 15 per-
centage points between 1974 and 1990, from 23.3 percent
to 38.3 percent, accounting for 73.9 percent of banks'
share decrease. So, for the most part, stronger growth in
other intermediated credit accounted for banks' loss of
market share in short-term nonfinancial business credit.
Only 26.1 percentofbanks' share loss went to commercial
paper.
Given the steady decline in banks' market share, it is
natural to try to seek an explanation. For this purpose, I
will use the regression results presentedin the last section,
but the shortcomings of that regression model must be
pointed out.
Specifically, because the model is estimated in first
difference form, there exists the possibility that, even ifit
fits quite well, it is a very poor predictor of long-run
changes in the dependent variable. For example, a single
non-zero residual in one period in the first-difference
equation means that the implied underlying level of the
dependent variable (calculated using a starting point and
accumulating one-period changes) will be offby the value
ofthe residual in all subsequent periods. Thus, using the
regression results to predict long-run changes in levels
from a fixed starting point, as opposed to predicting
period-to-period changes, can be misleading, and there is
no objective way to judge the extent ofthe error.
However, even though I have no estimated model ofthe
long-run change in banks' market share, I can use the esti-
mated model of short-run changes to demonstrate infor-
mally the plausibility of certain explanations for banks'
market share decline. First, in Figure 3, Panel A, I use the
estimated model to predict the transformed level of bank
share, by using the level at the beginning ofthe period as a
starting pointand then sequentially adding the sum to date
ofthe predictedperiod-to-periodchanges. Although the
predicted levels generally are too low during the period up
to 1972, the predicted series does a·fairly good job of
tracking the fluctuations in the actual series. Then, the
predicted series misses the briefsurge in 1972 that pre-
cedes the plunge in 1974, but seems to catch the plunge
itself.. Then,from 1976 through mid-1978 and from 1983
through 1990, the predicted series tracks the actualseries
fairly closely in leliels. Between mid-1978 and 1983, the
predicted level is off, but the changes are approximately
correct.
The implied levels model includes lagged values ofthe
dependent variable as explanatory variables, andthe pre-




SOURCES OF SHORT-TERM NONFINANCIAL
BUSINESS CREDIT
To judge this, the difference betweenthe predicted level at
the beginning ofthe period and the end ofthe period was
calculated, and the contributions ofbeginning- to end-of-
period changes in the various explanatory variables to the
predicted decline were estimated.
As it turns out, the only explanatory variables that
changed so as to contribute to a decline in the dependent
variable were the lagged values ofthe dependent variable,
the time trend, and the risk premium. The simple effect of
the passage oftime between 1962 and 1990 accounted for
86.1 percent ofthe total predicted decline, this total being
the sum ofthe effects ofonly those variables that contrib-
uted to a decline. (The sum of the negative predicted ef~
fects was - 1.25, while the netpredictedchange in the de-
pendent variable, adding in the positive effects of the
changes in the capital-to-assets ratio, the savings spread,
and the extent of interstate banking, was -0.88. The
actual change in the dependent variable between the first
quarterof1962andthefourthquarterof1990 was - 0.86.)
The change in the laggeddependent variable accounted for
13 percent, and the risk premium accounted for 0.9 per-
cent. Attributing the effect of the change in the lagged
dependentvariableproportionally to the time trend andthe
riskpremium, thepassageoftime accountedfor closeto 99
percent of the decrease, while the change in the risk
premium accounted for about 1 percent of the decline.28
However, ifwe restrict our attention to the period after
1973, a slightly different picture emerges. The capital-to-
assets ratio started to increase around 1974. (See Figure
A4in the Appendix.) The increase was at first rather sharp,
thenreverseditselfin the secondhalfofthe 1970s, andthen
resumed around 1980. Given the negative coefficients on
the capital-to-assets ratio, the net increase in the capital-
to-assets ratio since 1974 must have contributed to the
decline in banks' share since then. However, the part that
the change in the capital-to-assets ratio played still was
relatively small; the change in the capital-to-assets ratio
alone accounted for 7.3 percent of the estimated decline.
The other factors in the decline, the passage of time, the
laggeddependentvariable, andthe riskvariable, accounted
for 68.4 percent, 21.5 percent, and 2.9 percent of the
predicteddecline, respectively. (In the 1974to 1990period,
the sum of the negative predicted effects was -0.93,
while the net predicted change in the dependent variable,
adding in the positive effects of the other variables, was
28. This assumes that the model is correctly specified in that no
explanatory variables have been omitted. Because this is open to
question, the actual sizes ofthe effects ofthe passage oftime and the
change in the risk premium likely are somewhat less than this, but still
greaterthan those calculated without attributing any oftheeffectofthe
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lagged values ofthe dependent variable can be calculated
in two ways. One way uses the actual lagged values, as
shown in Panel A. The alternative, "dynamic forecast-
ing," uses the lagsofthepredicted values ofthe dependent
variable. This more rigorous "test" ofthemodel is shown
in Panel B. Judging by appearances, the dynamic forecast-
ing procedure gives a picture that is roughly similar to the
one seen in Panel A.
Finally, Panel C presents a third test that is again
somewhat more rigorous than the last. Here, the dynamic
forecasting procedure is used, but the model is estimated
with datafrom 1960 through 1985 only. The fitted model is
then used for out-of-sample prediction ofthe level over the
period 1986 through 1990. Again, the model does fairly
well capturing changes in bank market share. The model
seems to have the most trouble from mid-1986 through the
third quarter of 1987.27
All in all, though, the model seems to capture banks'
fall-off in market share fairly well. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to speculatethatthe same factors that appear to
contribute to negativefirst differences may also have con-
tributed to the long, fairly steady decline seen since 1974.
27. Figure 3 uses the regression results based on the Flow of Funds
measureofoffshorecredit, ratherthan the McCauley and Sethmeasure.
Comparable results were obtained with the McCauley and Seth data.28 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
- 0.77. The actual change in the dependent variable
between the first quarter of1974 and the fourth quarter of
1990 was -0.89.) Again, attributing the effect of the
change in the lagged dependent variable proportionally to
the other variables, the passage oftime, the change in the
capital-to-assets ratio, and the change in the risk premium
accounted for about 87 percent, 9.3 percent, and 3.7 per-
cent, respectively, ofthe decline in bank market share.
Given the apparent unimportance of changes in the
capital-to-assets ratio and ofthe risk premium, relative to
the importance ofthe unexplained effect ofthe time trend,
the model presentedinthis paperdoes not really "explain"
why banks' market share in short-term business lending
shrank over the past30 years. However, among thefactors
considered in this study, it is fair to say that the capital-
to':assets ratio and the risk premium are the two variables
that are most likely to have played a part in that decline,
with the capital-to-assetsratio ofslightly more importance
than the risk premium.
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FIGURE 3
DEPENDENT VARIABLE PREDICTIONS
A: ACCUMULATION OF PREDICTED
FIRST DIFFERENCES



























NOTE: In all three panels, TSHARE = log s/(l-s), where s =
(short-term bank business loans/total short-term business credit).
NOTE: Based on1962.Q2 to 1985.Q4.As discussed in Section II, an increase in its capital-to-
assets ratio decreases the value of a bank's subsidy from
deposit insurance and thereby reduces the bank's prof-
itabilityandcompetitiveness. Putanotherway, abankwith
a higher capital-to-assets ratio must compensate for the
loss in subsidy in some way-for example, by charging
higher loan rates, reducing services to borrowers and/or
depositors, orpaying lower deposit rates-to maintain an
adequate return on equity. But this strategy cannot be
followed for long without the bank losing market share to
creditors offering more favorable terms.
Whether a general increase in the capital-to-assets ratio
is in fact an important element ofthe story ofwhy banks
have become less and less competitive in the provision of
short-term business credit since the mid-1970s remains
very open to question. If, however, increases inthe capital~
to-assets ratio did have the effect thatis beingpositedhere,
it is important to point out that this study does not then
imply that required .capital-to-assets ratios for banks
should be 10wered.lfbankshavebeen receiving apositive
subsidy through deposit insurance, then it very likely is
desirable to raise capital requirements to eliminate that
subsidy and give banks the incentive to control their risk-
taking. Unless there are specific welfare or market failure
reasons for continuing to subsidize banks, a cutback in
subsidization is necessary, despite the possible effect on
bank competitiveness. Extreme caution must be used in
assessing the net effect ofany decrease in capital require-
ments, given that such a move would likely increase the
public's potential deposit insurance liability.
Regarding the risk variable, whether this variable is in
fact representative of a risk premium or the stance of
monetary policy, it appears that, as long as it is above its
meanfor the period, banks lose market share in short-term
business lending. As it turns out, over the 1962 to 1990
periodfor whichthe level ofbankmarketshareis simulated
(and over the 1974 to 1990 period), the sum ofthe above-
average values ofthe risk variable exceeds the sum ofthe
below-average values, so the overall effect of the risk
variable is to lower bank market share between 1962 and
1990 (and between 1974 and 1990).29 This is consistent
with the interpretationoftheriskvariable as representative
ofeither a risk premium or the stance ofmonetary policy.
An increase in the risk premium was predicted to have an
ambiguous effect onbankmarket share, while a tightening
ofmonetarypolicy was predictedto have anegative effect.
29. The mean ofthe riskvariable was taken to be the mean forthe entire
1960 through 1990 period. Therefore, had the contemporaneous instead
?fthe lagged valueofriskbeenincludedinthemodel, andhadthe change
III bank market share between 1960 and 1990 been the focus, the risk
variable would have played no role. This is because the above-average




lending in the short run. The theoretical part ofthe paper
emphasizedfour general types ofvariables: the level ofrisk
in the economy, the relative benefits to banks versus other
types ofcreditors offinancial innovation, bank regulatory
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Afterdiscussingthe theoretical effectsofthese variables on
the supply and demand for short-term bankbusiness credit
relativetoothertypesofshort-termbusinesscredit, empiri-
cal measures of these variables were introduced and a
simple linear model in first differences was presented and
estimated.
Estimation of the model yielded several interesting
conclusions. First, banks' market share in short-termbusi-
ness lending appears to respond to only some of the
theoretical variables thatwereconsidered. Amongthe vari-
ables considered, only the risk premium, the aggregate
weightedcapital-to-assets ratio, the spread between the
market interest rate and the deposit interest rate ceiling,
and the extent ofinterstate banking laws seem to matter in
the determination of short-run changes in banks' market
share. In addition to these, the mere passage oftime plays
an important but non-illuminating role.
Second, banks' market share appears to fall in the short
run when the risk premium is above its long-run mean and
when the capital-to-assets ratio rises. On the other hand,
market share rises in the short run as the opportunities for
interstate banking become more widespread, in accord-
ance with interstate banking being a proxy for the level of
interbank competition. The effect of an increase in the
interest rate spread is positive at some lags and negative at
others, but is positive on net after two years.
Third, the model in first differences was used to explore
informally the reasons for the steady decline in bank
values of risk, by construction, would have exactly offset the below-
average values. However, because ofthe lag structure ofthe model, the
first period for which alevel ofbank share is simulated is the first quar-
ter of 1962. This means that I examine the role of risk in explaining
thechangeinmarketsharebetweenonly1962and1990. Furthermore, the
first difference of the dependent variable depends on the first lag of
the risk variable. As aconsequenceofthese factors, tti.e risk variable con-
tributes to a 28-year decline in bank market share, largely because the
sumofthe above-average values ofthe risk variable, summedoverthe 28
years over which the simulation is conducted, exceeds the sum of the
below-average values.
Separately, it is interesting to note that the large spike in the risk
variableoccurs atpreciselythe sametimethatbanks' marketsharebegan
to plunge. (See Figure AI in the appendix.)30 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
competitiveness in short-term business lending since the
mid-1970s. After demonstrating that the estimated model
may shed some light on this issue, despite the lack of
cointegration, it was concluded that, among the variables
considered, only the capital-to-assets ratio and the risk
variable could have played any role. Although these vari-
ables "explain" only a small proportion of the decline,
their effects appear to be consistent with plausible theo-
ApPENDIX
The following are plots ofthe seven explanatory variables:
FIGUREAl
RISK
retical explanations. First, the increase in the aggregate
capital-to-assets ratio since about 1974 may have contrib-
uted somewhat to the decline in bank competitiveness
by decreasing banks' deposit insurance subsidy. Second,
the above-average values of the risk variable since the
mid-1970s, representingeitheranunusuallyhigheconomy-
widedefaultriskpremiumorunusualtightnessinmonetary
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NOTE: RISK = 6-month commercial paper interest rate-6-month
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NOTE: TBHIGH = highest 6-month Treasury bill interest rate to date
NOTE: RESREQ = (aggregate required reserves/total bank assets)
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NOTE: SPREAD = difference between 3-month Treasury bill interest
rate and ceiling on interest rate on savings deposits, ifthis difference
is positive, zero otherwise
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FIGUREA7
INTERST
NOTE: INTERST = percentage oftotal bank assets held by bank
holding companies that are headquartered in states that permit
interstate banking32 FRBSF EcONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 2
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